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Abstract
Across the empirical sciences, few statistical procedures rival the popularity of
the frequentist t-test. In contrast, the Bayesian versions of the t-test have languished
in obscurity. In recent years, however, the theoretical and practical advantages of
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the Bayesian t-test have become increasingly apparent and various Bayesian t-tests
have been proposed, both objective ones (based on general desiderata) and subjective
ones (based on expert knowledge). Here we propose a flexible t-prior for standardized
effect size that allows computation of the Bayes factor by evaluating a single numerical
integral. This specification contains previous objective and subjective t-test Bayes
factors as special cases. Furthermore, we propose two measures for informed prior
distributions that quantify the departure from the objective Bayes factor desiderata
of predictive matching and information consistency. We illustrate the use of informed
prior distributions based on an expert prior elicitation effort.
Keywords: Bayes factor, informed hypothesis test, prior elicitation
2
1 INTRODUCTION
The t-test is designed to assess whether or not two means differ. The question is fundamen-
tal, and consequently the t-test has grown to be an inferential workhorse of the empirical
sciences. The popularity of the t-test is underscored by considering the p-values published
in eight major psychology journals from 1985 until 2013 (Nuijten et al., 2016); out of a
total of 258,105 p-values, 26% tested the significance of a t statistic. For comparison, 4%
of those p-values tested an r statistic, 4% a z statistic, 9% a χ2 statistic, and 57% an
F statistic. Similarly, Wetzels et al. (2011) found 855 t-tests reported in 252 psychology
articles, for an average of about 3.4 t-tests per article.
The two-sample t-test typically assumes that the data are normally distributed with
common standard deviation, that is, Y1i ∼ N (µ + σδ2 , σ2) and Y2j ∼ N (µ − σδ2 , σ2) for
i = 1, . . . , n1 and j = 1, . . . , n2. The parameter µ is interpreted as a grand mean, σ as the
common standard deviation, and δ as the (standardized) effect size. A typical application
involves a treatment group and a control group and the task is to infer whether or not
the treatment has an effect. The null hypothesis of the treatment not being effective
corresponds to H0 : δ = 0 and implies that the population means of the two groups are the
same, while the two-sided alternative H1 allows the effect size to vary freely, and implies
that the population means of the two groups differ.
This article concerns the Bayesian t-test originally developed by Jeffreys (1948) in
the one-sample setting, and recently extended to the two-sample set-up by Go¨nen et al.
(2005) and, subsequently, Rouder et al. (2009). In his work on hypothesis testing, Jef-
freys focused on the Bayes factor (Etz and Wagenmakers, 2017; Kass and Raftery, 1995;
Ly et al., 2016b,a; Robert et al., 2009), the predictive updating factor that quantifies the
change in relative beliefs about the hypotheses H1 and H0 based on observed data d
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(Wrinch and Jeffreys, 1921, p. 387):
P (H1 | d)
P (H0 | d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Posterior odds
=
p(d | H1)
p(d | H0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
BF10(d)
P (H1)
P (H0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prior odds
. (1)
The Bayes factor is given by the ratio of the marginal likelihoods of H1 and H0 that are
obtained by integrating out the model parameters with respect to the parameters’ prior
distribution. For the two-sample t-test, the null model H0 specifies two free parameters
ζ = (µ, σ), while the alternative has three, namely, (ζ, δ) = (µ, σ, δ). Once the priors pi0(ζ)
and pi1(ζ, δ) are specified, the parameters of each model can be integrated out as follows
BF10(d) =
∫
∆
∫
Z
f(d | δ, ζ,H1) pi1(δ, ζ) dζ dδ∫
Z
f(d | ζ,H0) pi0(ζ) dζ . (2)
Eq. 2 shows that the Bayes factor can be regarded as the ratio of two weighted averages
where the weights correspond to the prior distribution for the parameters. Consequently,
the choice of the prior distributions is crucial for the development of a Bayes factor hypoth-
esis test. Jeffreys (1961) elaborated on various procedures to select priors for a Bayes factor
and the construction of his one-sample t-test became the norm in objective Bayesian anal-
ysis (e.g., Bayarri et al., 2012; Berger and Pericchi, 2001; Liang et al., 2008). Jeffreys’s
Bayes factor for the two-sample t-test, however, was needlessly complicated and it was
Go¨nen et al. (2005) who provided the desired simplification.
The innovation of Go¨nen et al. (2005) was to reparameterize the means of the two
groups, µ1 and µ2, in terms of a grand mean and the effect size, as was introduced at
the start of this section. Following Jeffreys, the second idea was to use a right Haar
prior pi0(µ, σ) ∝ σ−1 on the nuisance parameters, the parameters common to both the
null and the alternative model (Bayarri et al., 2012, Berger et al., 1998, Severini et al.,
2002). Using this prior choice, the marginal likelihood of the null model –the denominator
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of the Bayes factor BF10(d)– is proportional to the density of a standard t-distribution
evaluated at the observed t-value. The third idea was to decompose the prior under the
alternative hypothesis into a product of the prior used under the null hypothesis, and a test-
relevant prior on the (standardized) effect size, that is, pi1(µ, σ, δ) = pi0(µ, σ)pi(δ). Finally,
Go¨nen et al. (2005) showed that a normal prior δ ∼ N (µδ, g) on the effect size yields a
Bayes factor for the two-sample t-test that is easily calculated:
BF10(d;µδ, g) =
1√
1+nδg
Tν(
t√
1+nδg
;
√
nδ
1+nδg
µδ)
Tν(t)
, (3)
where 1
b
Tν(
t
b
; a) denotes the density of a t-distribution with ν degrees of freedom, non-
centrality parameter a and scale b, Tν(t) = Tν(t ; 0) denotes the density of a standard
t-distribution, and d refers to the data consisting of degrees of freedom ν = n1 + n2 − 2,
the observed t-value t =
√
nδ(y¯1 − y¯2)/sp, where nδ = (1/n1 + 1/n2)−1 is the effective
sample size, and νs2p = (n1 − 1)s21 + (n2 − 1)s22 the pooled sums of squares.1 This means
that practitioners who can calculate a classical t-test can also easily conduct a Bayesian
two-sample t-test: they only need to choose the hyperparameter µδ corresponding to the
effect size prior mean and the hyperparameter g corresponding to the prior variance. For
brevity, we refer to the latter choice δ ∼ N (µδ, g) as a g-prior on δ, since it resembles the
priors Zellner (1986) proposed in the regression framework.2
Later Bayes factors for the two-sample t-test proposed by Rouder et al. (2009) and
Wang and Liu (2016) retained the first three ideas: the parameterization in terms of the
grand mean and effect size, the use of the right Haar prior on the nuisance parameters
1In fact, the Bayes factors for the two-sample t-test discussed here also cover the one-sample case, by (1)
replacing the effective sample size by the sample size n; (2) replacing the degrees of freedom ν by n−1; and
(3) replacing the two-sample t-value by its one sample equivalent t =
√
ny¯/sy, where νs
2
y =
∑n
i=1(yi− y¯)2.
2When µδ = 0, the normal g-prior on δ translates to Zellner’s g-prior on the mean difference (µ1−µ2) ∼
N (0, gσ2).
5
pi0(µ, σ) ∝ σ−1, and the decomposition pi1(µ, σ, δ) = pi0(µ, σ)pi(δ), but they differ in the
choice of the test relevant prior pi(δ). Wang and Liu (2016) noted that the Bayes factors
of Go¨nen et al. (2005) are information inconsistent, which implies that the Bayes factor
in favor of the alternative does not go to infinity when the observed t-value increases
indefinitely. To make the Bayes factor information consistent, Wang and Liu (2016) in-
stead proposed to assign g a Pearson type VI/beta prime hyper-prior distribution (see
also Maruyama and George, 2011, for this proposal in the regression context). Inspired by
the developments of Liang et al. (2008) in the regression framework, Rouder et al. (2009)
proposed to replace the normal prior on δ by a Cauchy prior pi(δ) = Cauchy(δ ; 0, γ), a
choice that resembles that of Jeffreys (1948) proposition for the one-sample t-test with
prior scale γ = 1. In their response to Wang and Liu (2016), Go¨nen et al. (ress) stressed
the relevance of a subjective prior specification and noted that the Bayes factors proposed
by Rouder et al. (2009) and Wang and Liu (2016) are not flexible enough to incorporate
available expert knowledge, since these objective Bayes factors are based on priors that are
centered at zero. Here –without taking sides in the discussion between objective and subjec-
tive inference– we present a generalized form of the Bayes factor developed by Rouder et al.
(2009) that allows the prior specification to be informed by substantive domain knowledge.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the proposed
Bayes factor and two measures for quantifying the departure from Jeffreys’s desiderata of
predictive matching and information consistency. Section 3 demonstrates, using a concrete
example, how the proposed Bayes factor can be used in practice to incorporate expert
knowledge based on a prior elicitation effort. The article ends with concluding comments.
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2 THEORY
We use the framework of Go¨nen et al. (2005) and extend the priors proposed by Rouder et al.
(2009) to allow for more informed Bayesian t-tests. We exploit the fact that, with pi0(µ, σ) ∝
σ−1, the Bayes factor can be written as3
BF10(d) =
∫
Tν(t |
√
nδδ)pi(δ)dδ
Tν(t)
, (4)
where Tν(t | a) denotes the density of a t-distribution with ν degrees of freedom and non-
centrality parameter a. The numerator can be easily evaluated using numerical integration.
Consequently, Eq. 4 shows that researchers can easily obtain a Bayes factor based on any
proper prior for the standardized effect size δ by inserting the prior density of interest for
pi(δ).
We propose the use of a flexible t-prior for δ, that is, pi(δ) = 1
γ
Tκ(
δ−µδ
γ
), allowing prac-
titioners to incorporate expert knowledge about standardized effect size by specifying a
location hyperparameter µδ, a scale hyperparameter γ, and a degrees of freedom hyperpa-
rameter κ. The resulting Bayes factor is given by:
BF10(d;µδ, γ, κ) =
∫
Tν(t | √nδδ) 1γTκ( δ−µδγ )dδ
Tν(t)
, (5)
where the integral in the numerator can be easily calculated using free software packages
such as R (R Core Team, 2016). We believe that the proposed Bayes factor based on a t-
prior for effect size has a number of advantages. First, similar to the Bayes factor proposed
by Go¨nen et al. (2005) –which is a special case obtained by taking γ =
√
g and κ → ∞–
it allows researchers, if desired, to incorporate existing expert knowledge about effect size
into the prior specification furthering cumulative scientific learning. Second, this class of
3A derivation is provided in the online appendix (Theorem A.1, Theorem A.2, and the associated
corollaries).
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priors contains the Cauchy prior of Rouder et al. (2009) as a special case (obtained by
setting κ = 1, µδ = 0). Therefore, using the same expression, researchers can incorporate
expert prior knowledge or they can use an objective default prior. Third, this set-up allows
researchers to quantify the departure from Jeffreys’s predictive matching and information
consistency desiderata based on departure measures proposed below. This enables a more
formal assessment of differences between objective and subjective prior choices and may
benefit the dialog between objective and subjective Bayesians (see, e.g., Wang and Liu,
2016, and Go¨nen et al., ress).
2.1 Two measures for the departure from Jeffreys’s desiderata
2.1.1 Predictive matching
Jeffreys considered two desiderata for prior choice. The first desideratum, predictive match-
ing, states that the Bayes factor should be perfectly indifferent (i.e., BF10(d) = 1) in case
the data are completely uninformative. Recall that the alternative model has three free
parameters; it is therefore natural to require at least three observations before conclusions
can be drawn. Consequently, Jeffreys required a Bayes factor of 1 for any data set of
size smaller or equal to 2, thus, for ν = 0. As apparent from Eq. 1, this requirement
guarantees the posterior model odds to be the same as the prior model odds for com-
pletely uninformative data sets. For instance, the data set dν<min consisting of only one
observation in each group n1 = n2 = 1 automatically has zero sums of squares, that is,
νs2p = 0. If y¯1 6= y¯2 the associated t-value would then be unbounded. Let f(d | δ) denote
the reduced likelihood (i.e., the likelihood with the nuisance parameters integrated out):
f(d | δ) = ∫ ∫ f(d |µ, σ, δ)σ−1dµdσ. Using a lemma distilled from the Bateman project
(Bateman et al., 1954, 1953; Ly et al., 2018), straightforward but tedious computations
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show that f(d | δ) is proportional to the density of a t-distribution with ν degrees of free-
dom and non-centrality parameter
√
nδδ (see Theorem A.2 in the online appendix for
details). To convey that nothing is learned from the data set dν<min, Jeffreys chose pi(δ)
such that
p(dν<min | H0) = p(dν<min | H1) =
∫
f(dν<min | δ)pi(δ)dδ. (6)
As νs2p = 0, nδ = 1/2, and y¯1 6= y¯2, we obtain
(2|y¯1 − y¯2|)−1 =
∫
(2|y¯1 − y¯2|)−1
[
1 + sign(y¯1 − y¯2)Erf( δ2)
]
pi(δ)dδ, (7)
where sign(z) is one when z is positive, minus one when z is negative, and zero otherwise
(see Corollary A.1.3 and Corollary A.2.1 in the online appendix). Erf(z) = 2√
pi
∫ z
0
e−u
2
du
is the error function, an odd function of z. Note that the requirement Eq. 7 is fulfilled if a
proper symmetric prior is used for δ. Based on Eq. 7 we define the (two-sided) departure
of any proper prior with respect to Jeffreys’s predictive matching criterion as
D(pi,Pred | dν<min) =
∫
sign(y¯1 − y¯2)Erf( δ2)pi(δ)dδ, (8)
and note that BF10(dν<min) = 1 + D(pi,Pred | dν<min). For instance, a t-prior located at
µδ = 0.350, with scale γ = 0.103 and κ = 3 degrees of freedom, as used later on in the
example, has a departure of the predictive matching criterion of 0.0198 when y¯1 > y¯2. In
other words, for completely uninformative data sets with y¯1 < y¯2 the Bayes factor will
be BF10(dν<min) ≈ 0.98, while if y¯1 > y¯2 the Bayes factor would be BF10(dν<min) ≈ 1.02,
instead.
2.1.2 Information consistency
The second desideratum, information consistency, states that the Bayes factor should pro-
vide infinite support for the alternative in case the data are overwhelmingly informative
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(Bayarri et al., 2012; Jeffreys, 1942). An overwhelmingly informative data set for the two-
sample t-test is denoted by dinfo,ν with ν ≥ 1, effective sample size nδ > 1/2,4 a (pooled)
sums of squares νs2p = 0, and an observed mean difference y¯1− y¯2 6= 0, thus, an unbounded
t-value. For such an overwhelmingly informative data set dinfo,ν to provide infinite support
for the alternative, Jeffreys required that p(dinfo,ν | H0) is bounded and that pi(δ) is chosen
such that
∫
f(dinfo,ν | δ)pi(δ)dδ diverges. With νs2p = 0 and y¯1 6= y¯2 the marginal likelihood
of the null model becomes
p(dinfo,ν | H0) =
Γ(ν+1
2
)
2pi
ν+1
2
√
ν + 2
(
nδ(y¯1 − y¯2)2
)−ν+1
2 , (9)
which is indeed bounded (see Corollary A.1.3 in the online appendix). In Corollary A.2.2
of the online appendix it is shown that for δ large, the reduced likelihood f(dinfo,ν | δ) with
νs2p = 0 behaves like a polynomial with leading order ν, that is,
f(dinfo,ν | δ) ∼ δν . (10)
To guarantee for degrees of freedom ν that
∫
f(dinfo,ν | δ)pi(δ)dδ diverges, it suffices to take
a prior that does not have the νth moment. As information consistency should hold for all
ν ≥ 1, this implies that pi(δ) should be chosen such that it does not have a first moment.
Based on the condition that the marginal likelihood should already diverge for ν = 1, we
define the departure of Jeffreys’s information consistency criterion as
D(pi, InfoConsist) = argmin
{
ν ∈ N :
∫
f(dinfo,ν | δ)pi(δ)dδ 6∈ R
}
− 1. (11)
If pi(δ) is taken to be a t-prior with κ degrees of freedom the departure from Jeffreys’s
information consistency criterion is κ − 1, since a t-distribution has κ − 1 moments. For
instance, a t-prior with κ = 3 degrees of freedom has only two moments and, therefore,
4This condition implies that there is at least one observation per group.
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misses the information consistency by two samples. This means that the Bayes factor only
goes to infinity for overwhelmingly informative data when ν ≥ 3. Therefore, an informed t-
prior with degrees of freedom larger than one requires more observations to be “convinced”
by the data than does an objective prior with degrees of freedom equal to 1.
2.1.3 Practical value of the proposed departure measures
The departure measures introduced above can be used to issue recommendations for re-
searchers who would like to incorporate expert knowledge into the prior specification, but
would also like to retain Jeffreys’s desiderata as much as possible. For the proposed t-prior,
we recommend that researchers who would like to retain information consistency choose
κ ∈ (0, 1]. For instance, setting κ = 1 results in a Cauchy prior. Note that, crucially,
information consistency still holds if this Cauchy prior is centered on a value other than
zero which enables one to incorporate expert knowledge about effect size by shifting the
prior away from zero. Researchers who want to retain predictive matching should specify
the prior to be centered on zero (i.e., µδ = 0); however, the scale parameter γ and the
degrees of freedom κ can be chosen freely. Next, we demonstrate with an example how the
proposed Bayes factor can be used in practice. The example features a prior elicitation
effort (e.g., Kadane and Wolfson, 1998) highlighting the practical feasibility of specifying
an informed prior based on expert knowledge.
3 PRACTICE
The facial feedback hypothesis states that affective responses can be influenced by one’s
facial expression even when that facial expression is not the result of an emotional expe-
rience. In a seminal study, Strack et al. (1988) found that participants who held a pen
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between their teeth (inducing a facial expression similar to a smile) rated cartoons as more
funny on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 0-9 than participants who held a pen with
their lips (inducing a facial expression similar to a pout).
In a recently published Registered Replication Report (Wagenmakers et al., 2016), 17
labs worldwide attempted to replicate this finding using a preregistered and independently
vetted protocol. A classical random-effects meta-analysis yielded an estimate of the mean
difference between the “smile” and “pout” condition equal to 0.03 [95% CI: −0.11, 0.16].
Furthermore, one-sided default Bayesian unpaired t-tests (using a zero-centered Cauchy
prior with scale 1/
√
2 for effect size, the current standard in the field of psychology; see
Morey and Rouder, 2015) revealed that for all 17 studies, the Bayes factor indicated evi-
dence in favor of the null hypothesis and for 13 out of the 17 studies, the Bayes factor in
favor of the null was larger than 3. Overall, the authors concluded that “the results were
inconsistent with the original result” (Wagenmakers et al., 2016, p. 924).
Here we present an informed reanalysis of the data of one of the labs based on a prior
elicitation effort with Dr. Suzanne Oosterwijk, a social psychologist at the University of
Amsterdam with considerable expertise in this domain. The results for the other labs can
be found in online appendix C.
3.1 Prior elicitation
Before commencing the elicitation process, we asked our expert to ignore the knowledge
about the failed replication of Strack et al. (1988). Next, we stressed that the goal of
the elicitation effort was to obtain an informed prior distribution for δ under the alter-
native hypothesis H1, that is, under the assumption that the effect is present. This was
important in order to prevent unwittingly eliciting a prior that is a mixture between a
point mass at zero and the distribution of interest. Then, we proceeded in steps of in-
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creasing sophistication. First, together with the expert we decided that the theory spec-
ified a direction, implying a one-sided hypothesis test. Next, we asked the expert to
provide a value for the median of the effect size: this yielded a value of 0.35. Subse-
quently, we asked for values for the 33% and 66% percentile of the prior distribution for
the effect size: this yielded values of 33%-tile = 0.25 and 66%-tile = 0.45. To finesse
and validate the specified prior distribution we used the MATCH Uncertainty Elicitation
Tool (http://optics.eee.nottingham.ac.uk/match/uncertainty.php; see also online
appendix B), a web application that allows one to elicit probability distributions from
experts (Morris et al., 2014). Furthermore, we used R’s (R Core Team, 2016) plotting ca-
pabilities for eliciting the prior number of degrees of freedom. The complete elicitation
effort took approximately one hour and resulted in a t-distribution with location 0.350,
scale 0.102, and 3 degrees of freedom. As shown in the theory part, this prior choice has a
departure from the predictive matching criterion of ±0.0198 and misses information con-
sistency by two samples. It should be emphasized, however, that the goal of this prior
elicitation was to construct a prior that truly reflects the expert’s knowledge without being
constrained by considerations about Bayes factor desiderata. Alternatively, in an elicita-
tion effort that puts more emphasis on these desiderata, one could, for instance, fix the
degrees of freedom to one and let the expert only choose the location and scale.
3.2 Reanalysis of the Oosterwijk replication study
Having elicited an informed prior distribution for δ under the alternative hypothesis, we now
turn to a detailed reanalysis of the facial feedback replication attempt from Dr. Oosterwijk’s
lab at the University of Amsterdam. This data set features 53 participants in the “smile”
condition with an average funniness rating of 4.63 (SD = 1.48), and 57 participants in the
“pout” condition with an average funniness rating of 4.87 (SD = 1.32); consequently, the
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observed t statistic is t(108) = −0.90.
The alternative hypothesis is directional, that is, the teeth condition is predicted to
result in relatively high funniness ratings, not relatively low funniness ratings. In order to
respect the directional nature of the alternative hypothesis the two-sided informed t-test
outlined above requires an adjustment. Specifically, the Bayes factor that compares an
alternative hypothesis that only allows for positive effect size values to the null hypothesis
can be computed via a simply identity that exploits the transitive nature of the Bayes
factor (Morey and Wagenmakers, 2014):
BF+0(d) =
p(d | H+)
p(d | H1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
BF+1(d)
p(d | H1)
p(d | H0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
BF10(d)
= BF+1(d)BF10(d). (12)
We already showed how to obtain BF10(d), that is, the Bayes factor for the two-sided test
of an informed alternative hypothesis; the correction term BF+1(d) can be obtained by
simply dividing the posterior mass for δ larger than zero by the prior mass for δ larger than
zero.5 The Bayes factor hypothesis test that we report will respect the directional nature
of the facial feedback hypothesis and include the correction term from Eq. 12.
Fig. 1 shows the results of the reanalysis of the data from the Oosterwijk lab. The
displayed prior and posterior distribution do not impose the directional constraint. The
one-sided Bayes factor based on the informed prior equals BF0+(d; 0.350, 0.102, 3) = 11.5,
indicating that the data are about twelve times more likely under the null hypothesis than
under the one-sided alternative hypothesis.
For comparison, Fig. 2 displays the results based on the default one-sided zero-
centered Cauchy distribution with scale 1/
√
2. The one-sided default Bayes factor equals
BF0+(d; 0, 1/
√
2, 1) = 8.7, indicating that the data are about 9 times more likely under
5The expression for the marginal posterior distribution for δ is provided in Corollary A.2.3 in the online
appendix. Using this expression, numerical integration can be used to obtain the desired posterior mass.
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Figure 1: Results of an informed reanalysis of the facial feedback hypothesis replication
data from the Oosterwijk lab. The dotted line corresponds to the elicited 1
0.102
T3
(
δ−0.350
0.102
)
prior distribution. The solid line corresponds to the associated posterior distribution, with
a 95% credible interval and the posterior median displayed on top. The Bayes factor
in favor of the null hypothesis over the one-sided informed alternative hypothesis equals
BF0+(d; 0.350, 0.102, 3) = 11.5. Figure available at https://tinyurl.com/mk7uaxm under
CC license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/.
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Figure 2: Results of the default analysis of the facial feedback hypothesis replication data
from the Oosterwijk lab. The dotted line corresponds to the default Cauchy prior distri-
bution with scale parameter 1/
√
2. The solid line corresponds to the associated posterior
distribution, with a 95% credible interval and the posterior median displayed on top. The
Bayes factor in favor of the null hypothesis over the one-sided default alternative hypoth-
esis equals BF0+(d; 0, 1/
√
2, 1) = 8.7. Figure available at https://tinyurl.com/mgs28ob
under CC license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/.
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the null hypothesis than under the one-sided default alternative hypothesis. Hence, both
the informed and the default Bayes factor yield the same qualitative conclusion, that is,
evidence for the null hypothesis. However, the unrestricted posterior distributions differ
noticeably between the informed and the default analysis: the posterior median based
on the informed prior specification is positive and equal to 0.153 (95% credible interval:
[−0.264, 0.390]) whereas the posterior median based on the default prior distribution is
equal to −0.152 (95% credible interval: [−0.511, 0.200]).
4 CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The comparison between two means is a quintessential inference problem. Originally devel-
oped by Jeffreys (1948) in the one-sample setting, the Bayesian t-test has recently been ex-
tended to the two-sample set-up by Go¨nen et al. (2005) and, subsequently, by Rouder et al.
(2009) and Wang and Liu (2016). Here we showed that practitioners can easily and intu-
itively use a generalized version of the Bayes factor by Rouder et al. (2009) to inform their
two-sample Bayesian t-tests. We used the framework of Go¨nen et al. (2005) and extended
the priors by Rouder et al. (2009) to allow for more informed Bayesian t-tests that can in-
corporate expert knowledge by using a flexible t-prior. An advantage of the flexible t-prior
is that it contains the objective default prior by Rouder et al. (2009) as a special case and
the subjective prior proposed by Go¨nen et al. (2005) as a limiting case. Therefore, practi-
tioners can use the same formula to compute subjective and objective Bayesian t-tests. To
encourage its adoption in applied work, we have implemented the proposed Bayesian t-test
set-up in the open-source statistical program JASP (JASP Team, 2018, jasp-stats.org).
In the theoretical part of this article, we investigated theoretical properties of the informed
t-prior. Specifically, we discussed popular Bayes factor desiderata and proposed measures
17
to quantify the deviation of an informed t-test from its objective counterpart. In the practi-
cal part of the article, we illustrated the use of the informed Bayes factor with an example.
Similar to the prior proposed by Go¨nen et al. (2005), the flexible t-prior may encourage the
use of prior distributions that better represent the predictions from the hypothesis under
test, allowing more meaningful conclusions to be drawn from the same data (Rouder et al.,
2016a, 2016b).
Other choices than a t-prior for effect size are conceivable. Eq. 3 shows that one can
obtain a Bayes factor for any scale-mixture of normals by integrating Eq. 3 with respect
to a prior on g (see Theorem A.3 in the online appendix; for possible choices see, e.g.,
Liang et al., 2008 and Bayarri et al., 2012). This also includes the prior proposed by
Wang and Liu (2016) and highlights that it is straightforward to extend this prior to in-
clude a location parameter that can be specified based on expert knowledge. In fact, the
expressions for the Bayes factor that we presented make it relatively straightforward to
use any proper prior on standardized effect size (see Eq. 4). The proposed departure mea-
sures can then be used to investigate information consistency and predictive matching for
different choices.
In this article, we focused on the Bayes factor as the inferential tool for quantifying the
relative evidence for competing hypotheses based on observed data. However, it could be ar-
gued that a complete Bayesian analysis requires one to also specify the prior plausibilities of
the competing hypotheses. This is of particular importance in situations where unlikely hy-
potheses are tested or when multiple comparisons are considered (Scott and Berger, 2010).
Although specifying the prior plausibilities of the competing hypotheses may not be trivial,
once this has been achieved, the Bayes factor can be simply multiplied by the prior odds
to obtain the posterior odds of interest.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Online Appendix: Informed Bayesian T -Tests: Derivations, details about prior elicitation,
and additional analyses. (pdf)
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